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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLYING DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION,
formerly known as FLYING DIAMOND
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited
partnership; RALPH M. NEWTON,
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F.
NEWTON, general partners; and
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually,
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON, his wife,:
and

Case No. 19178

Defendants-Respondents.

BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO.,
a Texas corporation,
Intervenor DefendantRespondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, ET AL.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff-appellant brought the instant action for
declaratory judgment contending that it was entitled to a 2 1/2
percent payment provided for in a Surface Owner's Agreement
entered into between Champlin Petroleum Company and Newton.
The case sought a resolution as to conflicting claims to the
percentage payment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Flying Diamond Oil Company, brought
suit in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, on
June 30, 1978, seeking various relief against Newton Sheep
Company, et al., and included in Count I, which is relevant to
this appeal, an action for declaratory judgment (R. 1-4).

The

instant appeal concerns only the matter raised in Count I of
the appellant's complaint and the counterclaim thereto.

An

answer and counterclaim were duly filed by Newton Sheep
Company, et al. (R. 17) and a reply duly filed by appellant
(R. 28).

Subsequently, Bass Enterprises Production Company

sought and was granted intervention (R. 89, 90).

Thereafter,

Bass filed an answer and counterclaim to the complaint of
Flying Diamond and a cross-claim against Newton Sheep.

Bass

contended for an interest in the payment involved in the
litigation by virtue of a deed from Newton to Bass (R. 94).
Replies were duly filed by Flying Diamond and Newton to the
Bass pleadings (R. 109, 174).

An amended answer, counterclaim,

and cross-claim were filed by Bass and duly replied to by
Flying Diamond and Newton.

A pretrial order was entered by the

trial court setting forth the narrow issue to be tried in the
case (R. 276).

It was agreed that the only issues to be tried

were Flying Diamond's claims for declaratory judgment and the
counterclaims thereon.

Trial was held in the District Court of

-2-

Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
Jr., District Judge, presiding, on January 19, 1982.

Following

the trial, an inteclocutory judgment was entered on May 20,
1982, signed May 19, 1982 (R. 431, 433).

Findings of fact and

conclusions of law were also entered at the same time (R. 426,
430).

A motion denying a motion to amend the proposed findings

of fact and judgment was entered on June 7, 1982.

A final

judgment was signed April 8, 1983, and entered April 13, 1983
(R. 450).

The trial court's judgment was in favor of Newton

and Bass and against Flying Diamond.

A notice of appeal was

duly filed by the appellant on May 2, 1983.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Newton Sheep Company, seeks to have the
judgment of the trial court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The instant appeal involves litigation over certain
interests arising out of real estate transactions in Summit
County, Utah.

The defendant, Newton Sheep Company, is the

successor in interest to properties originally owned by Hyrum
J. Newton Company, a corporation (T. 7).

The company became a

limited partnership and the defendants include the partnership
and the individual partners.

On September 24, 1971, Champlin

Oil Company, a subsidiary of Union Pacific Railroad, entered
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into a Surface Owner's Agreement with Newton 1 (R. 2).

The

mineral interest claimed by Champlin, and not in dispute in
this matter, is from a railroad grant to Union Pacific
Railroad.

This is not a case where the mineral interest was

alienated to an oil company developer subject to reservation.
It is the interest conveyed by the Surface Owner's Agreement
that is involved in this litigation (Exhibit 1, R. 476).
Section 2 of the Surface Agreement provided:
Champlin agrees, so long as it is receiving
oil and/or gas production from or oil and/or gas
royalties upon production from the described
premises or allocated thereto under the
provisions of a unitization agreement, to pay or
cause to be paid to the Land Owner in cash the
value on the premises of two and one-half percent
(2 1/2%) of all the oil and gas and associated
liquid hydrocarbons hereafter produced, saved,
and marketed therefrom or allocated thereto as
aforesaid, except oil and gas and associated
liquid hydrocarbons used in operations on the
premises or used under the unitization agreement,
and except that as to cashinghead gasoline and
other products manufactured from gas there shall
be deducted the cost of manufacture; • • • • "

1.

The trial transcript in the instant case refers to the
Surface Owner's Agreement as a service owner's
agreement. This appears to be a mistake of the court
reporter.
Newton Sheep Company will be referred to as "Newton"
and Bass Enterprises Production Company as "Bass".
Appellant will be referred to as Flying Diamond even
though it has changed its name.
The documents in the Record will be cited as (R.
).
The trial transcript will be referenced as (T. ~y-;
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Section 4 of the agreement expressly disclaimed that the
agreement constituted any covenant to drill by Champlin.
Section 5 made Chacplin liable for damage to the land owners
(surface owner), lands, buildings, and growing crops caused by
the erection or construction of facilities in conjunction with
oil and gas operations (R. 476).

Section 7 of the Surface

Agreement provided:
Subject to the provisions of Section 9
hereof, it is agreed that the covenants to pay
the sums provided in Sections 2, 3, and 5 hereof
shall be covenants running with the surface
ownership of the described premises and shall not
be held or transferred separately therefrom, and
any sums payable under this agreement shall be
paid to the person or persons owning the surf ace
of the described premises as of the date the oil
or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon
production is marketed.
Champlin shall not,
however, become obligated to make such payments
to any subsequent purchaser of the described
premises and shall continue to make such payments
to the Land Owner until the first day of the
month following the receipt by Champlin of notice
of change of ownership, consisting of the
original or certified copies of the instrument or
instruments constituting a complete chain of
title from the Land Owner to the party claiming
such ownership, and then only as to payments
thereafter made.
Subsequent to the Surface Owner's Agreement being
entered into, Newton conveyed by deed part of the royalty
interest or payment entitlement due Newton under the Surface
Agreement (Exhibit 1) to the intervenor, Bass Enterprises
(T. 12, R. 484).

The deed transferring the interest was dated
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l·ebruary 1, 1972.

The deed encompassed fee lands as well as

railroad lands, but only the railroad lands are involved in
this case.

At the time Newton owned the surface of the lands

in question and Union Pacific Railroad,
the mineral interests.

~.

Champlin, owned

Newton also owned fee lands and mineral

interests that were not owned by the railroad.

At the time of

the execution of the deed to Bass Enterprises, the Surface
Owner's Agreement was of record and Bass and Newton were aware
fo the Surface Owner's Agreement (T. 11).

Scott Newton, a

general partner and secretary of Newton (T. 58), acknowledged
that the purpose of the deed to Bass was to convey one-half of
the 2 1/2 percent payment interest that Newton had by virtue of
the Surface Agreement with Champlin (T. 60, 65).

The deed from

Newton to Bass expressly mentioned the Union Pacific Railroad
Company lands (R. 485) and purported to grant, bargain, sell,
convey, transfer, assign, and deliver to Bass "one-half of the
royalty (of any type) from production of minerals that the
grantor actually received or is entitled to receive until
February 1, 2072 from identified Union Pacific lands. 11
(R. 484, Exhibit 2).

The deed, therefore, purported to assign

one-half of the 2 1/2 percent interest that Newton had from the
Surface Owner's Agreement to Bass.

Thereafter, on April 12,

1974, Newton , as seller, entered into a real estate contract
with appellant, Flying Diamond Corporation (R. 489).
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The

surface rights that Newton owned in the railroad and other
lands were conveyed to Flying Diamond.

Paragraph 6 of that

agreement provided that the property being transferred "shall
include the full surface and one-half of the oil, gas and other
mineral rights and estates of" Newton.

The mineral interest

was defined as including "one-half of the royalty (of any type)
from the production of minerals that the seller actually
receives or is entitled to receive from the property so
designated in Attachment A-1 until January 1, 2073."

Thus,

Newton's conveyance to Flying Diamond was expressly limited to
one-half of the royalty interest remaining that had not been
conveyed to Bass that Newton was entitled to by virtue of the
Surface Owner's Agreement (R. 493).

Scott Newton expressly

advised Flying Diamond that Newton had sold SO percent of the
2 1/2 percent royalty interest to Bass and that Newton wanted
to keep at least one-half of the remaining interest they
owned.

This would mean that Newton would keep one quarter of

the 2 1/2 percent and Flying Diamond would receive one quarter
of the 2 1/2 percent (T. 64, 6S).

The language on page 4 of

the Ranch Purchase Contract between Newton and Flying Diamond
(Exhibit 3) pertaining to the royalty interest is the same
language as appears on page 2 of the Bass/Newton contract
(T. SO), thus showing that both agreements contemplated the
same royalty or payment interest.
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At the time of trial, Judge Baldwin indicated that
although he would receive testimony about the transactions
between the parties he would not consider the evidence for the
purposes of varying the terms of the agreements but would have
to study the agreements to properly interpret them (T. 54).
Following the presentation of some testimony and further
argument of counsel, the Court again refused to allow any
testimony to come in in violation of the parol evidence rule
(T. 82-84).

The Court also indicated that although it would

receive the depositions of Russell E. Neihart, William B.
Callister and Robert B. Logerstrom that the Court would not
receive the depositions for altering the written documents
(T. 83-92).

Judge Baldwin expressly said that he would not

allow parol evidence to interpret the contract between the
parties (T. 92).

Further, after the court's ruling, counsel

for the appellant expressly requested the Court to read all of
the depositions and offered a greater amount of the deposition
evidence than had been offered by Newton or Bass (T. 83-92).
Based upon the evidence heard and the contracts, the
trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
They were entered on May 19, 1982 (R. 426-430).

The Court

found that Newton entered into the Surface Agreement with
Champlin in September of 1971, which agreement was recorded
October 1, 1971 (R. 427).

That in February, 1972, Newton
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conveyed to Bass by warranty deed recorded on Mrtrch 20, 1972,
one-half of the royalty payment from the production of minerrtls
that Newton was entitled to receive.

The Court found that Bass

was charged with knowledge of the terms of the Surface Owner's
Agreement (R. 428).

The Court found that in April,·1974,

Flying Diamond, with knowledge of the Surface Owner's
Agreement, and the Bass/Newton deed entered into the ranch
purchase contract (Exhibit 3) in which they acquired one-half
of Newton's oil, gas and mineral rights through the language
previously referred to herein (R. 428).

The Court found that

Newton's transfer to Flying Diamond was with the intent that
Flying Diamond acquire one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment
referred to in the Surface Agreement (R. 428).

The Court's

conclusions of law were to the effect that the Surface Owner's
Agreement did not prohibit an assignment of an interest in
monies paid by Champlin under the agreement and that there was
no express prohibition in the Surface Agreement (Exhibit 1)
against an assignment by Newton of an interest in the 2 1/2
percent payment.

The deed from Newton to Bass was held

effective to assign to Bass one-half of the 2 1/2 percent
payment.

The ranch purchase contract was held to have retained

for Newton one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment.

The Court

concluded that appellant, Flying Diamond, was entitled to
retain one-fourth of the 2 1/2 percent payment.
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The Court

I

,1

r

th er found that Flying Diamond was es topped to deny that it

'"1ly had a one-fourth interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment and
that Newton and Bass were not estopped to assert the interests
t'1e Court found the parties were entitled to in the 2 1/2
percent payment (R. 429).

The interlocutory judgment was

entered thereon and the final judgment entered on April 13,

1983 (R. 460),

i~plemented

the Court's findings and conclusions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT UNDER THE SURFACE
AGREEMENT WAS NOT A COVENANT RUNNING WITH THE
LAND TO WHICH FLYING DIAMOND OR THE SURFACE OWNER
WAS PERPETUALLY ENTITLED.
Flying Diamond contends that it is entitled to the
2 1/2 percent interest referred to in the Surface Agreement
between Newton and Champlin Oil Company by virtue of the fact
that Flying Diamond subsequently acquired the surface
interest.

Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 1 provides that Champlin

agrees so long as it is receiving oil and/or gas production
from or oil and/or gas royalties upon production from the
described premises or allocated thereto under the provisions of
a unitization agreement, to pay or caused to be paid to the
landowner in cash the value on the premises of two and one-half
percent (2 1/2%) of all oil and gas and associated liquid
hydrocarbons hereinafter produced.
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The right for anyone to

receive payment under the Surface Agreement is conditioned upon
production of oil and gas and a royalty allocation from the
production.

The agreement also provides for the payment of the

2 1/2 percent from the commingling when the production of oil
from lands under the several surface ownerships is placed in
one central bank.

Section 5 of the Surface Agreement provides

that Champlin is required to pay for all damage to the
landowner's lands, buildings and growing crops caused by the
erection or construction of facilitl8s to be used in connection
with oil or gas or associated liquid hydrocarbon operation and
to take various other actions to protect the surface of the
lands.

This obligation of Champlin is unrelated to the 2 1/2

percent payment.

Therefore, the 2 1/2 percent payment is not

to compensate the surface owner for injury to the property
since Section 5 is an indemnification provision to cover the
mineral developer's obligation to pay the surface owner or any
damage to the land and to take actions to protect the surface
owner's interest.

Section 7 provides that "the covenants to

pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3 and 5 shall be covenants
running with the surface ownership of the described premises
and shall not be held or transferred separately therefrom, and
any sums payable under this agreement shall be paid to the
person or persons owning the surface of the described premises
as of the date of the oil and gas or associated liquid
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hydrocarbon production is marketed."

(R. 480)

Section 7

further provides that Champlin shall not become obligated to
make payments to any subsequent purchaser of the premises until
such time that Champlin is "given notice of a change of
ownership".

From these provisions Flying Diamond contends that

Newton could not have transferred any interest in the 2 1/2
percent payment right to Bass or any other persons separate
from the surface interest because the provisions of Sections 2
and 7 constitute covenants running with the land.

Newton

respectfully submits that Flying Diamond misconstrues the
concept of covenants running with the land and that the
payments provision in paragraph 2 of the Surface Agreement does
not constitute a covenant running with the land nor does
Section 7 make it so, but rather the provision of Section 2
grants to the landowner the right to receive a payment based on
production equal to 2 1/2 percent of the value of the
production.

The Surface Agreement does not grant Newton a

specific right in any mineral but only a right to receive
payment.

Nor does Section 2 obligate Newton to do anything

with the payment.

It need not be used on the land to improve

it, but may be used in any way the landowner wants.

The grant

under Section 2 is therefore not something about the land or a
reserved interest that Newton once had in the mineral estate.
The interest here should be compared with a right to a specific
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mineral interest which could improve

d

covenant running with

the land because it would directly effect the land.
Restatement of Property, §§ 543 and 544.

See,

Here, Newton's right

to any part of the 2 1/2 percent payment is not based on any
previous interest in the land that Newton had.
contractual right to receive a personal payment.
such an interest as '•il 1 run with the land.

Rather, it is a
This is not

Newton or the

surface owners had no obligation to the land that involved or
involves the 2 1/2 percent payment.

The criteria for

determining whether a covenant runs with the land are spelled
out in 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 30:
The primary test whether the covenant runs
with the land or is merely personal is whether it
concerns the thing granted and the occupation or
enjoyment thereof, or is a collateral or a
personal covenant not immediately concerning the
thing granted.
In order that a covenant may run
with the land it must have relation to the land
or the interest or estate conveyed, and the thing
required to be done must be somethig which
touches such land, interest, or estate and the
occupation, use, or enjoyment thereof. Whether a
particular covenant is sufficiently connected
with the use of land to run with the land must be
in many cases a question of degree. There must
also be privity of estate between the parties to
the covenant, and the covenant must be consistent
with the estate to which it adheres and of such
character that the estate will not be defeated or
changed by the performance thereof. A covenant
in a deed is not made one running with the land
merely by the fact that it is a part of the
consideration expressed in the deed.
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* * * *
In the event that the act to be performed is
merely collateral to the land and does not relate
to the property demised, then the assignee is not
charged, though named in the covenant. The
covenant is merely personal, and does not affect
the land demised. The fundamental principle that
only those covenants which touch and concern the
laDd, even though the assignee is named in the
covenant, can run with the land and charge the
assignee, is enunciated in Spencer's Case, a
leading English case on the law of covenants.
In appellant's brief appellant places great emphasis
on the language of Section 7 of the Surface Agreement.
However, the mere fact that Section 7 of the Surface Agreement
characterizes the 2 1/2 percent payment as a covenant running
with the land does not make it such.

In 20 Am. Jur. 2d,

Covenants, Conditions, Etc., § 30, it is noted:
If a covenant is not in its nature and kind
a real covenant, the declaration of the parties
in the instrument that it shall run with the land
cannot create a real covenant.
If no interest
passes and no possession attends the conveyance,
the convenant obviously does not run with the
land.
In H.T.C. v. Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P.2d 950 (1916), this
Court observed that a covenant of warranty by one neither
having possession nor title does not run with the land.

The

2 1/2 percent payment, therefore, must be measured against the
legal criteria for covenants running with the land to determine
whether it is a covenant real or a personal covenant.

If the

criteria are not met for a covenant running with the land
Section 7 of the Surface Agreement cannot make it such.
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It is submitted that when the substance of the Surface
Agreement is actually analyzed against the relevant legal
criteria that the only conclusion that can be legitimately
drawn is that the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a covenant
running with the land.

First, it is submitted that the 2 l/2

percent payment does not directly relate to the land or touch
and concern the land.

Second, it is submitted that the

relationship between Flying Diamond, Champlin and Newton is
such that there is no privity of estate but at best privity at
contract, and third, it is submitted that the intention
standard is at best ambiguous.
In The City of Tucson v. Superior Court of Pima
County, 116 Ariz. 322, 569 P.2d 264 (App. 1977), suit was
brought relating to a conveyance of a ten-foot strip of land to
the defendant county.

One of the counts alleged that the

property was conveyed to Pima County in consideration for a
promise that Pima County would not assess the retained portion
of plaintiff's property for the proposed widening and
improvement of a road.

Plaintiff's understandings constituted

covenants running with the land.

The only theory on which the city could be liable
is if the county's promise were a covenant
running with the land. To create such a covenant
at law, four prerequisites must be met:
(1)
there must be a writing which satisfies the
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statute of frauds; (2) the parties must intend
that the covenant run with the land; (3) the
covenant must touch and concern the land; and (4)
privity of estate must exist between the original
granter and the grantee at the time the covenant
is made.
The court found the interest involved was not a covenant
running with the land.

The court concluded:

Since the complaint alleged conveyance of the
ten-foot strip to the county and its subsequent
acquisition by the city by annexation, and failed
to allege facts burdening the property with an
equitable servitude in favor of the plaintiffs,
no claim for breach of covenant lay against the
city.
The court's assessment of the case was that there was not any
imposition against the land and, therefore, since the property
was not burdened there could be no covenant running with the
land, since the touch and concern criteria was not met.

A case

relevant to the issue before the court is Choisser v. Eyman, 22
Ariz.App. 587, 529 P.2d 741 (1974).

1lte case involved an

action to determine the ownership of refund rights under a
water extension agreement to service property.

A contention

was made that the refund payments were covenants running with
the land.

1lte court observed:
To create a covenant at law, four
prerequisites must be met:
(1) there must be a
writing which satisfies the Statute of Frauds;
(2) th parties must intend that the covenant run
with the land; (3) the covenant must touch and
concern the land, i.e. make the land itself more
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useful or valuable to the benefited party; and
(4) privity of estate must exist between the
original granter and the grantee at the time the
covenant is made. C. Smith and R. Boyer, Survey
of the Law of Property, 356 (2d Ed. 1971).
In
determining whether the entire agreement,
including the rights to refunds, runs with the
land, it is important to differentiate between
the agreement to supply water and the
consideration given to effectuate that supply.
The court then went on to say that an agreement to supply water
to property can be a covenant running with the land citing the
Restatement of Property, § 548, but then went on to say:
However, the right to receive the refunds, the
subject of this appeal, does not touch and
concern the land. By Clause 7 itself, the right
to receive the refunds, is a personal right
enforceable by appellant alone. Restatement of
Property§ 544 (1944). Being a personal right,
it cannot, by definition, be a covenant running
with the land.
The case is analagous to the instant case since the right under
Section 2 of the Surface Agreement is a right to receive
payment which is not a matter that touches and concerns the
land especially when the payment is not obligated for the
benefit of the land.

The requirement that a covenant running

with the land actually relate to the land is a part of the
element of touch and concern.
484 P.2d 821 (1971).

Updegrave v. Agee, 258 Ore. 599,

In Johnson v. State By and Through The

Highway Division, 27 Ore.App. 581, 556 P.2d 724 (1976), a
declaratory judgment was sought contending that a covenant
given by the predecessors in interest to the plaintiffs ran
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with the land and was binding upon the plaintiffs.

The

covenant provided that the state would not be required to pay
for removal or destruction of a house on the property in the
event the state required additional right of way for a
highway.

The court held that the covenant did not run with the

land because the benefit to the state contained in the covenant
was in no way tied to the land owned.

One of the elements that

the court referred to for a covenant running with the land was
that the promisee must benefit in the use of some land
possessed by him as the result of the performance of the
promise.

The court held that was lacking in the covenant.

Essentially, there was an insufficient connection to the land
to justify finding a covenant running with the land.

In

California Packing Corporation v. Grove, 57 Cal.App. 253, 196
P. 891 (1921), the court held that a covenant running with the
land requires a direct grant of the property and is the direct
benefit of the property.

Neither factor is present in the

instant case, since the grant by Champlin to Newton was of a
right to receive money and there is no direct benefit to the
property in question.

In Colonia Verdi Homeowners Ass'n v.

Kaufman, 122 Ariz. 574, 596 P.2d 712 (App. 1979), the court
observed that a covenant running with the land is something
that involves "a general plan of development and improvement of
the property."

Such an interest would be one of quiet
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enjoyment.
(1924).

Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 Pac. 460

If the agreement is merely collateral to the land and

not an integral part of the property, no covenant running with
the land can be found.
A decision from this

C~urt,

Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 28

Utah 2d 28 (1972), is directly relevant to this issue.

There

the question arose as to whether a provision for the payment of
attorneys' fees necessary for enforcement of the terms of an
agreement was a covenant running with the land.

This Court

held that such a provision could not be a covenant running with
the land.
In regard to the plaintiffs' further
argument that the contract provision for
attorney's fees, assumed by successive assignees,
and/or combined with the judgment, constitutes a
covenant running with the land and is therefore
binding on Alyce Husgands and Nick Caravelli
against whom the execution was directed, this is
to be said:
In order for a covenant to run with
the land it must be of such character that its
performance or nonperformance will so affect the
use, value, or enjoyment of the land itself that
it must be regarded as an integral part of the
property. Examples are the covenants of seizin,
the right to convey, freedom from encumbrances,
and of quiet and peaceable possession.
Contrasted to these are covenants to perform
personal obligations under the contract, which
ordinarily do not so run.
Under the concept just
stated a provision in a purchase contract to pay
attorney's fees necessary for enforcement of its
terms does not meet the qualification for a
covenant which runs with the land.
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!n Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99 Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619
(1940), the court also stated that attorneys' fees in an
agreement were matters of personal payment and did not
constitute covenants running with the land.

The case law,

therefore, seems to support the proposition that generally the
right to receive a payment is not necessarily a covenant
running with the land especially where it is not dependent upon
any obligation towards the land itself.

In the instant case,

Champlin was otherwise obligated independent of the 2 1/2
percent payment to protect the surface estate.

Champlin

already had a right to the use of the surface estate in pursuit
of its mineral interests.

Flying Diamond Corporation v. Rust,

551 P.2d 509 (Utah 1976).

Newton was not obligated to employ

the 2 1/2 percent in any way to the betterment of the land.
Thus, the touch and concern element of a covenant running with
the land is not present.

Contrast this court's position in

Ruffinego v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978), where the court
held a covenant running with the land existed where the
covenant was one that directly benefited and protected the
land.

Therefore, the touch and concern element required for a

covenant running with the land is not present in the instant
case.
It is further submitted that the privity of estate
requirement for a covenant running with the land is not present

-20-

in the instant situation.

No interest in the land was conveyed

by Champlin to Newton nor by Newton to Champlin and then in
turn to Flying Diamond.

Champlin's interest in mineral estate

existed separate and apart from Newton's surface ownership
right.
concern.

The Surface Agreement was merely a contractual
The surface of the land and mineral estates were

separately owned.

Although the agreement between Newton and

Champlin creates a contractual privity, there is no privity in
the estate as distinct from the privity to receive a payment
from the oil and gas production.

Thus, it is submitted that

the classic requirement of privity of estate is missing.

In 20

Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, Etc., § 34, it is stated:
The term 'privity of estate' connotes a mutual or
successive relationship to the same rights of
property, and not privity in estate or mutuality
with the meaning of the feudal law. Therefore,
unless privity of estate exists, as thus defined,
the covenant is purely a personal obligation,
neither binding nor benefiting the land in the
hands of heirs, devisees, or assigns.
A distinction is made between privity of
contract and privity of estate, and the rule is
that privity of contract alone is insufficient to
carry the benefit of a covenant to subsequent
owners of the property.
Finally, it is submitted that the intention
requirement for a covenant running with the land is not present
in this case in the sense of an intent to create a legal
interest in property, but, rather, merely a covenant or
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"arranty to accommodate Champlin's willingness to pay the
revenue from 2 1/2 percent of production for its protection.
It should also be roted that Champlin agrees to make payment to
a transferee only on notice of transfer.

Champlin has no

interest in making the payment to any particular persqn except
to satisfy its contractual obligations in accordance with the
Surface Agreement.

Champlin has no concern as to any

assignment of any interest in the payment as to third person
except that it not be obligated to any third person.

Its

concern is one of accounting to insure that the payment be made
to an identified individual.

Roger D. Lagerstrom , an employee

of Champlin Oil Company, gave a deposition which was offered
into evidence by Flying Diamond that Champlin had no interest
and wouldn't care what happened so far as an assignment between
the surface owner and a third person as to the proceeds of the
Champlin payment.

(Lagerstrom Deposition, 35-37).

It is

submitted, therefore, that the type of intention required for a
covenant running with the land is lacking or at least
ambiguous.

In First Western Fide lit;):'. v. Gibbons

& Reed

Com12ani, 27 Utah 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971)' this court dealt with
a claim that a covenant running with the land was created by an
agreement to leave the tract of property contoured for
residential supervision purposes after removing sand, gravel
and fill materials thereform.

The court found that the
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requisite requirement of "some permanent effect of a physical
nature upon the la~d itself" was present but that the language
of the contract was ambiguous as to whether the µarties
intended a covenant for a definite improvement of the land
which would inure to the benefit of subsequent transferees.

In

the absence of a clear intention the court would not find a
covenant running with the land.

See also, Metropolitan

Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962).

In

the instant case, what was actually intended so far as
benefiting the land is not clear and, therefore, the intention
element of a covenant running with the land is not present.
It must be concluded that the trial court was correct
in refusing to find that the Surface Agreement created a
covenant real running with the land.
POINT II
THE 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT IN THE SURFACE
AGREEMENT WAS SUBJECT TO ASSIGNMENT TO THIRD
PERSONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO CHAMPLIN'S LIABILITY.
If the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a covenant running
with the land the question arises as to whether it may be
conveyed in whole or part by the surface owner at a time that
the surface owner has the contractual interest to the 2 1/2
percent payment.

In this case, Newton, as the surface owner,

having a right to the 2 1/2 percent payment transferred a
one-half interest in the 2 1/2 payment to Bass pursuant to a
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deed.

The appellants contend that the 2 1/2 percent payment,

,111der the Surface Agreement, is not a "royalty" and, therefore,
could not be conveyed by Newton to Bass under the deed between
the parties.

A deed that meets the Statute of Frauds and

otherwise comports with law can transfer whatever interest it
purports to convey and if ambiguous the subject of the
conveyance can be established by extrinsic evidence.

Flying

Diamond not being a party or privity to the deed could not
object to parol evidence as to the intent of the parties.
Green v. Grant, 635 P.2d 236 (Colo.App. 1981).

The record in

the instant case is clear that both Newton and Bass intended
that a one-half interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment be
transferred from Newton to Bass.
that was a transferable interest.

The only question is whether
The argument that it was not

a "royalty" and, therefore, could not be transferred under the
deed is an argument in semantics not in legal substance.

It

may be that the 2 1/2 percent payment is not a royalty in the
traditional sense of something reserved by the land owner who
otherwise alienated the surface interest from a mineral
interest.

It is, however, recognized that a severed mineral

and a right to receive payment is a fully transferable interest
and one well recognized under oil and gas law.

in 8 Williams

Meyers Oil and Gas Law (Manual of Terms), p. 661, the
definition of royalty interest is stated:
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&

The property interest created in oil and gas
after a SEVERANCY (q.v.) by ROYALTY DEED (q.v.).
Its duration is like that of common law estates,
namely, in fee simple, in fee simply
determinable, for life or for a fixed term of
years.
It is distinguished from a MINERAL
INTEREST (q.v.) by the absence of operating
rights. The owner of a royalty interest is
entitled to a share of production.
The definition clearly fits the 2 1/2 percent payment in the
instant case.

On page 660 of the same work, a royalty deed is

defined as:

An instrument in writing conveying a ROYALTY
INTEREST (q.v.). The instrument must name the
grantor and the grantee, describe the land, give
the size of the interest, and contain the
signature of the grantor.
Thus, the instrument between Newton and Bass was a royalty deed
conveying a royalty interest, to-wit:

one-half of the 2 1/2

percent right to payment from the production of oil and gas.
In 1 Williams

& Meyers

Oil and Gas Law, § 301, the authors

discuss the various definitional terms applicable to oil and
gas matters.

With reference to a royalty interest, it is said

that it is "a right only to receive a certain part of the oil
produced*** free of exploration and production costs."
p. 440.

On page 445, the term "royalty interest" is explained:
Owner has right to receive a certain part of the
oil or gas, as, if and when produced, free of
costs of production; has no rights to develop or
lease.
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Further, in 8 Williams

~Meyers

Oil and Gas Manual of Terms,

473, the definition of non-participating royalty is equally
applicable to the 2 1/2 percent interest in this case.
Recently, this court in Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas

P.2d

and Mining,

(Utah, Nov. 4, 1983), considered the

interest of the plaintiff as a non-consenting mineral owner
under the pooling provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation
Act.

In discussing the interests at one point the court notes

that Shell Oil Company characterized its payment concession as
a "voluntary payment" and at another point the term royalty
inerest is utilized and payment from production.

The

implication from the case is that the terminology is not
settled and what is important is the substance that is
conveyed.

See also, Martin v. Glass, 571 F.Supp. 1406 (D.C.

N.D. Tex. 1983).

The deed contained all the necessary legal

prerequisites to transfer one-half of the 2 1/2 percent
interest and, therefore, accomplished the intention of the
parties.

Nor can Flying Diamond, as a stranger to the

contract, attack its terms and effect if the interest conveyed
was otherwise alienable.

§ 70A-2-107(1), Utah Code Ann. 1953,

is relevant to this issue.
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the
like (including oil or gas) or a structure or its
materials to be removed from realty is a contract
for the sale of goods within this chapter if they
are to be severed by the seller but until
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severance a purported present sale thereof which
is not effective as a transfer of an interest in
land is effective only as a contract to sell.
This definition highlights the distinction between mineral
interests and royalty interest and further emphasizes the fact
that a production payment of royalty interest after severance
is personalty and fully transferable.

In Hartman v. Potter,

596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979), this Court observed:

"Minerals

in place may be severed from the land, and when so severed they
become separate and distinct estates, held in separate and
distinct titles."

Therefore, there was no prohibition in the

transfer of one-half of the 2 1/2 percent Newton made to Bass
simply because of the definition of terms or the
characterization of the interest was a "royalty".
The real question is whether the provisions of Section
7 of the Surface Agreement would act to, in any way, prevent
Newton from transferring to Bass Newton's right to receive
payment.

The Restatement of Contracts, 2d, § 322, deals with a

contractual prohibition against assignment.

It states:

(1) Unless the circumstances indicate the
contrary, a contract term prohibiting assignment
of 'the contract' bars only the delegation to an
assignee of the performance by the assignor of a
duty or condition.
(2) A contract term prohibiting assignment of
rights under the contract, unless a different
intention is manifested, • . •
(b) gives the obligor a right to damages for
breach of the terms forbidding assignment but
does not render the assignment ineffective;
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(c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and
does not prevent the assignee from acquiring
rights against the assignor or the obligor from
discharging his duty as if there were no such
prohibition.
Further, Section 321 of the same work recognizes that an
assignment of future rights is effective in the same way as an
assignment of an existing writing.

Applying these sections to

the facts of the instant case it is apparent that the transfer
from Newton to Bass was a proper and legal transfer.

The

transfer to Bass in no way increased the burden of obligation
on Champlin.

It did not by delegation impose on Bass any duty

or condition that was due to Champlin by Newton.

There was

nothing personal that either Newton or Bass had to perform with
reference to Champlin.

The assignment was simply an assignment

of a right to future payment and under such circumstances could
be validly assigned to the assignee without impairing the
position of the obliger.

The legality of the assignment is not

affected and the only person who can complain would be Champlin
who would have a right for damages if any were incurred.

Since

it has not been affected by the assignment it has incurred no
damages and the transfer of one-half in the 2 1/2 percent
payment from Newton to Bass cannot be challenged.

The trial

court, therefore, acted properly in finding a legitimate
assignment of a one-half interest in the 2 1/2 percent from
Newton to Bass.
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Finally, it should be noted that the trial court's
construction and interpretation of the Newton/Bass transfer and
the Newton/Flying Ciamond contract was in keeping with the only
practical construction of the various instruments.
Newton/Bas~

In the

transfer Newton, which possessed the 2 1/2 percent

interest gave up one-half of that amount.

This left a one-half

interest in the 2 1/2 percent interest remaining in Newton.
The effect of the transfer under the Newton/Flying Diamond
Ranch Contract was to transfer one-half of the remaining
one-half leaving Newton with a one-quarter interest in the
2 1/2 percent and Flying Diamond receiving the same.

In

Hartman v. Potter, supra, this Court gave a similar
construction to various deeds transferring interests in oil,
gas and minerals.
POINT Ill
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CONTENDING THAT THEY
ARE ENTITLED TO THE FULL 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT.
When Newton entered into the Ranch Purchase Contract with
Flying Diamond on April 12, 1974 (R. 489), the Surface
Agreement with Champlin and Newton was on file as was the
Newton/Bass deed (R. 484).

Further, Flying Diamond was

expressly made aware of both the purpose of the Bass/Newton
deed and the desire of Newton to retain 1/2 of their remaining
entitlement to the 2 1/2 percent royalty interest (T. 61-65),
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Flying Diamond then drafted the Ranch Purchase Contract.

The

contract expressly referenced the intention of Newton in
paragraph 2 (R. 493) by providing "one half of the royalty (of
any type) from the production of minerals that the seller
actually received or is entitled to receive from the
property

. . until January 1, 2073" was conveyed leaving

Newton the remaining 1/2 or 1/4 of 2 1/2 percent.

That

language is virtually identical with the language in the
Bass/Newton deed (R. 485).

Thus, the clear purpose of the

Flying Diamond contract was to accommodate the interests of all
concerned to the 2 1/2 percent as divided.

The trial court so

found (R. 478) and concluded as a matter of law that Flying
Diamond "is estopped to deny that it has only a one-fourth
interest in the 2 1/2 percent payment."

(R. 429).

It is submitted that this conclusion is clearly correct for
three reasons:
First:
Contract.

Flying Diamond drafted the Ranch Purchase
Under such circumstances the instrument is to be

construed against Flying Diamond as the party drafting the
instrument.
~,

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Midwest Realty

& Finance,

544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975); Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28

Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Matter of Orr's Estate, 622
P.2d 337 (Utah 1980).

Further, such a construction comports

with the intention of the parties when all documents are
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construed together.

Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah

1979); Chourros v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982).
Second:

Flying Diamond may not by its action both claim

under the contract and at the same time claim it is not bound
by its terms.

It is recognized that a grantee (Flying Diamond)

may be estopped by equitable considerations.
Estoppel & Waiver § 13.

It

28 Am. Jur. 2d,

was recognized in Page v.

Fees-Kreg, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980); Hess v. Seeger, 55
Or. App. 746, 641 P.2d 23 (1981); that ordinarily a party (or
contract purchaser) cannot claim under an instrument without
affirming it.

A party may, by his subsequent conduct, be

estopped to claim estoppel or other prior benefit.
Building
1918).

& Loan

Utah State

Assn. v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (Utah

Flying Diamond being fully aware of the circumstances

cannot now claim the 2 1/2 percent.

Flying Diamond drafted the

contract to accommodate Newton who insisted on retaining their
1/4 percent.

Without the specific terms in the Ranch Contract

Newton would not close the deal, and most probably would have
required a more direct novation or release from Flying Diamond
of any claim to the 2 1/2 percent payment beyond that
specifically contained in the Ranch Contract.

The evidence

supports the conclusion that Newton relied on Flying Diamond
for the express recognition of their interest as well as that
of Bass.

As this court noted in Rodgers v. Hansen, 580 P.2d
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"33 (Utah 1978) generally one is not permitted in a court of
justice to take advantage of or claim protection by reason of
his own wrong.

See Provo City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497

P.2d 629 (1972); McFarland's Estate v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127,
417 P.2d 244 (1966); Feese v. Siesel's Estate, 534 P.2d 85
(Utah 1975); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1980). The circumstances fully support the application of
equitable estoppel against Flying Diamond.
Third, whatever claims that Flying Diamond may have been
entitled to assert to the 2 1/2 percent payment provided for in
the Surface Agreement have now merged into the Ranch Purchase
Contract to which Flying Diamond agreed.

Flying Diamond was

aware of the Surface Agreement and claims of Newton
regard to the 2 1/2 percent interest.

& Bass

in

Still Flying Diamond

entered into negotiations with Newton for the Ranch property
and a limited mineral interest.

Therefore, whatever claims

they had to the 2 1/2 percent, because of any prior instrument,
they compromised such claim and merged all terms of their
interest into the Ranch Contract.

Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d

50 (Utah 1978); Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah 1978);
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Neely v. Kelsch,
600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979).

This estops Flying Diamond from now

attempting to claim the full 2 1/2 percent payment contained in
the Surface Agreement (Exhibit 1).
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Tile trial court was clearly correct in concluding that
Flying Diamond was estopped to deny the Newton/Bass interests
and to claim the full 2 1/2 percent payment.
POINT IV
APPELLANTS MAY NOT CLAIM ESTOPPEL BY DEtD TO
CLAIM THE FULL 2 1/2 PERCENT PAYMENT INTEREST.
Tile appellants, Flying Diamond, attempt to invoke the
concept of estoppel by deed in their favor by asserting that
Newton may not deny the Surface Agreement.
application in the context of this case.

Tile doctrine has no
Tile Surface Agreement

(Exhibit 1, R. 476) goes no further than its own terms.

It

applies only to insure the respective signatories obtain that
for which they bargained.

It grants no further rights or

interests than are contained within its provisions.

Newton has

always maintained the 2 1/2 percent payment was one it held
personally and had the privilege to alienate.

Indeed, Flying

Diamond was aware of the Surface Agreement, the deed from
Newton to Bass, and the fact that Newton and Bass believed that
one-half of the 2 1/2 percent had been transferred by Newton to
Bass (T. 61-65).

Flying Diamond was also aware of the fact

that Newton believed they retained a one-half interest in the
2 1/2 percent payment and that Newton wanted to retain one-half
of the interest they held when Newton transferred the surface
and some royalty interest to Flying Diamond.
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Tile same language

nn the royalty interest was used in the Flying Diamond contract
as was used in the Newton/Bass deed thus showing that Flying
Diamond recognized the Newton/Bass interest.

Newton does not

deny Champlin's right to use the surface, nor does it deny
Champlin may make the royalty interest payment in accord with
the Surface Agreement.

What is at issue is the relationship

and claims of ownership to the 2 1/2 percent proceeds after
paid, as between Bass/Newton and Flying Diamond.

Thus, the

facts raise no issue for the doctrine of estoppel by deed.

It

is well established that estoppel by deed is not applicable
where the parties are aware of all the facts.

Ketchum Coal Co.

v. Pleasant Valley Const. Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917);
Rogers v. Donnellan, 11 Utah 108, 39 P. 474 (1975); Arizona
Central Credit Union v. Holden, 6 Ariz.App. 310, 432 P.2d 276
(1967).

28 Am Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5 notes:
Moreover, it has been held that if the party
claiming the benefit of the estoppel has not been
misled by the other party's deed, or recital
therein, no estoppel exists.

Further, the appellant appears to be claiming estoppel against
Newton and its privy Bass (although Flying Diamond is also in
privy with Newton on the Ranch Contract but not with Bass).
The contract between Flying Diamond and Newton conveyed what
Flying Diamond bargained for.

It did not purport to convey

more than what Flying Diamond actually received.
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Thus, Newton

is not estopped to deny it conveyed more than it did.

Flying

Diamond is trying to use estoppel to exceed the terms of the
Ranch Contract.

Tilis it cannot do.

As to any claim of estoppel drawn from the Surface

Agreement, there is no basis for estoppel by deed.

Estoppel is

not applicable where the deed is unclear as to the actual
conveyance.

Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976).

Tile doctrine of estoppel by deed cannot enlarge the conveyance
itself.

"To constitute an estoppel by deed, a distinct precise

assertion or admission of a fact is necessary.

Hence, estoppel

by deed or similar instrument can arise only where a party has
conveyed a precise or definite legal estate or right by a
solemn assurance which he will not be permitted to vary or to
deny.

Such estoppel should be certain to every intent."

Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5.
122 Utah 85, 246 P.2d 381 (1952).

28

See Dowse v. Kammerman,

It is also submitted that

the Surface Agreement between Newton and Champlin is not a deed
but a contract and the concept of estoppel by deed is not
strictly applicable.

Under the circumstances of this case,

estoppel by deed is not applicable.

Here the actual

relationship is as to the interests of each party to the 2 1/2
percent payment arising after the Surface Agreement.

Tile

doctrine of estoppel by deed applies to one who is in direct
legal relationship to the grantor.
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Flying Diamond's

relationship is direct only to Newton not Champlin.

The

contract from Newton to Flying Diamond, drafted by Flying
Diamond, expressly acknowledged the respondent's interests.
The concept of estoppel by deed in favor of Flying Diamond is
not conceptually compatible with the facts of this case.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT USE PAROL EVIDENCE TO ALTER
THE TERMS OF ANY INTEGRATED AGREEMENT RELEVANT TO THE
LITIGATION AND APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO
THE RECEIPT OF PAROL EVIDENCE BY AFFIRMATIVELY USING
SUCH EVIDENCE.
Newton submits that the appellant's contention that
the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence on the
intent of the parties is not well taken.

First, it should be

noted that appellant does not identify the objectionable
evidence or show how the trial court misused the evidence.
Indeed, there is no evidence that the trial court gave any
consideration to extrinsic evidence to alter any integrated
writing.

The appellant asserts extrinsic evidence was admitted

on the Surface Owner's Agreement (App. Brief p. 27).

An

examination of the trial court's findings of fact show that the
court did not consider any such evidence or reference such
evidence in the findings of fact.

The only reference to intent

in the findings of fact refers to the intention in the
Newton/Bass agreement and the Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch
contract (R. 428

~6,

9). Therefore, appellants have not raised

a true issue.
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Second, Judge Baldwin was sensitive to the parol
evidence problem.

At the time of trial, on January 19, 1982,

the court ruled (T. 66) that parol evidence on discussions
incorporated in the Flying Diamond/Newton agreement would not
be received.

The court also stated that it would not allow the

evidence to vary the terms of the Surface Contract (T. 54.
also T. 67; T. 83; T. 92).

See

The court never received any

evidence in violation of the parol evidence rule with reference
to the Champlin/Newton Surface Agreement.

The court sustained

objections even to the Newton/Bass Newton/Flying Diamond
documents.

The only reference to "intent" in the findings does

not purport to be based on extrinsic evidence, but is the
conclusion clearly to be drawn from the identical wording of
the Bass/Newton Deed and the Flying Diamond/Newton Ranch
contract.

Since parol evidence was not relied on by the court

to alter the writings or to base its findings on the meaning of
any agreement no issue exists on the point.

The parol evidence

rule only prohibits extrinsic evidence to add to, subtract
from, vary or contradict the terms of a complete and
unambiguous contract.

Combs v. Lufkin, 123 Ariz. 210, 598 P.2d

1029 (App. 1979); Neely v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979);
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974).
substantive law.

It is a rule of

Tahoe Nat. Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal.3d 11, 92

Cal.Rptr. 704, 480 P.2d 320 (1971); Loppe v. Breed, 504 P.2d
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1077 (Wyo. 1973); Gulotta v. Triano, 125 Ariz. 144, 608 P.2d 81
1App. 1980).
by

In the absence of any finding violating the rule

applying such evidence in a substantive fashion to alter or

contradict a fully integrated unambiguous written agreement no
error has been committed.
Third, the appellants have been the only party to
offer and use extrinsic evidence and have gone beyond any
proffer by respondents.

At the time of trial, counsel for

appellants insisted that all of the depositions offered into
evidence be read and even made an offer beyond that of Newton
or Bass (T. 89, 90, 91, 92).

The Lagerstrom deposition and

Callister deposition are cited and relied upon by the
appellants in their brief (App. Brief, 8, 9).

It is well

settled that a party cannot complain of the court's ruling
where the party thereafter affirmatively adopts or uses the
evidence.

United States v. Silvers, 374 F.2d 828 (7th Cir.

1967); United States v. Bramson, 139 F.2d 598, 600 (2nd Cir.
1943); Jarabo v. United States, 158 F.2d 509, 514 (1st Cir.
1946); Williams Bros. Grocery v. Blanton, 105 Ga.App. 314, 12
S.E.2d 479, 481 (1962); 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. 1940
§ 18(D), pp. 344-346.

The actions of appellant went beyond

self-defense and constitute a waiver of this issue.
Newton agrees with the holding in Hartman v. Potter,
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), that in the absence of ambiguity the
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terms of the written deed or integrated contract govern.

See

also, Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981).
In this case, the real ambiguity that the court could have used
extrinsic evidence for was the Newton/Bass Deed and the Flying
Diamond/Newton Contract which appeared ambiguous in light of
all the circumstances.

The same could be said of the

Champlin/Newton Surface Agreement.
Gibbons

& Reed,

See First Western v.

supra, where the court took extraneous evidence

on a claim of a covenant running with the land.

Also,

Metropolitan Inv. Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940
(1962).

The circumstances in this case are equally as

ambiguous.

Therefore, extrinsic evidence could be considered,

if it was, without violating the parol evidence rule.

Such

being the case, the trial court committed no error, and
certainly not prejudicial error.

Rule 4, Utah Rules of

Evidence (1971).
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
should be affirmed.

The court clearly recognized that

appellant's contention that the Surface Agreement created a
covenant running with the land could not be sustained.

That

the trial court rejected the contention of a covenant running
with the land is manifested from the notations the trial court
made on the plaintiff's trial memorandum (R. 377).

-39-

The legal

elements necessary to creating a covenant to run with the land
do not exist in this case.

The court was further correct in

finding that there had been a valid legal transfer from Bass to
Newton of a portion of the 2 1/2 percent right to receive
payment.

Further, the findings of fact &nd conclusions of law

of the trial court support the contention that Flying Diamond
is clearly estopped by its own Ranch Contract, which it
prepared from claiming more than the one-quarter of the 2 1/2
percent interest which the trial court awarded Flying Diamond.
No error was committed in the trial court.

The law was

properly applied and the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
William J. Cayias
CAYIAS, LIVINGSTON & SMITH
1558 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for Newton Respondents
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